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WASHINGTON'S LOYALTY OATH AND
"GUILTLESS KNOWING BEHAVIOR"
ARVAL A. MORRIS*
In Baggett v. Bullitt,' the Supreme Court of the United States ruled
that professors at the University of Washington could not be required
to execute two legislatively prescribed "loyalty" oaths. This high-court
decision ended a nine-year battle carried on by the University's faculty.
It marks a significant step forward in the achievement of constitutional
protection for intellectual liberty everywhere. It is now questionable
whether the act of swearing one's loyalty, as a condition of academic
employment, an act utterly unrelated to academic competence, can
constitutionally be required of a professor. Furthermore, the Court's
opinion casts a cloud of doubt over the oath laws of twenty-six states
which may now be caught in the decision's backwash. The purpose of
this article is to set forth a bit of the background, a description, and
several of the implications of Washington's loyalty oath case.
Two oaths were involved in the Washington case; one, a so-called
"positive loyalty oath," dating from 1931,2 and the other, a so-called
"negative disclaimer," which was distilled from several "anti-subver-
sive" laws enacted by the state legislature dating from 1951 to 1955.8
Both oaths involved assaults upon civil liberties and academic freedom.
They illustrate the truth in the observation made by Harold Hyman in
his full-dress study of loyalty tests in American history: that .loyalty
requirements are periodically seized upon and prescribed, over and
over again, "during wars, rebellions, and periods of fear of subversion."'
Thus, World Wars I and II, plus the cold war, predictably, raised the
question of loyalty. As will be seen, the 1931 oath was typical in that it
followed on the heels of a great war and a foreign scare.
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
1377 U.S. 360 (1964). This article also appears in the Fall issue of Law In
Transition.
2 Chapter 103, Laws of Washington (1931) ; RCW 28.70.150.
3 Chapter 254, Laws of Washington (1951) and Chapter 377, Laws of Washington
(1955) ; RCW 9.81.070. Consider Lincoln's statement regarding disclaimer oaths: "On
principle, I dislike an oath which requires a man to swear he has not done wrong. It
rejects the Christian principle of forgiveness on terms of repentence. I think it enough
if a man does no wrong hereafter." 8 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAm LINCOLN 169
(Basler ed. 1955).




The pitch of patriotism ran high during the years following the close
of World War I. Nativistic fervor created hysteria that served to re-
press civil liberties and discredited radical and progressive movements
that had grown up before the war.' As John Blum has pointed out, these
years saw a link forged between nativism, anti-radicalism and the fear
of foreigners.' We now know that the link between the anti-radical and
anti-alien forces was not a temporary liaison arising in response to
World War I and the Russian Revolution. But rather, this nativist
backlash has been of long duration, and has not yet fully worked out
its destiny. The historical forces at work include such items as the use
of summary deportation proceedings without giving an alien the full
due process of law, the amplified social tensions and frustrations
growing out of an unceasing urbanization and a continually concen-
trating industrialization, and, finally, the deeply-felt fears about the
security of our nation at home, and its failure to expand abroad.' In a
real sense, the years following World War I can be viewed as a time of
repression and brittleness-as a time when America lacked that vital
sustenance of flowing humanism that had seen her through earlier
crises.'
Repressions took their toll. Woodrow Wilson and the League of
Nations sank from sight; an anti-labor economic policy was announced
in the name of the "open shop," and it sent trade unionism into full
retreat. In 1924, ethnic restrictions were legislated into the immigra-
tion laws. Henry Ford pledged his reputation and power in a campaign
of virulent anti-semitism. In his book, The International Jew, Ford
pictured the "International Jewish Conspiracy" as responsible for all
the evils of the world, such as jazz, sex, urbanism, trade unionism,
finance capitalism, birth control, smoking and drinking.9 Worst of all
were the "Negro Zionists." But the Negroes and Jews were not alone.
Anti-Catholicism reached a perilous pitch in the 1928 Presidential cam-
5 See, e.g., ROCHE, THE QUEST FOR THE DREAm 51-184 (1963). This book is relied
upon for part of the factual information depicting post-World War I and II moods of
America.
6 Blum, Natvisi, Anti-Radicalism, and the Foreign Scare, 1917-1920 3 MmWEST J.
46 (1951).
7For development of these themes see, PRESTON, ALIENS AND DisSENERs: FEDRL
SUPPRESSION OF RADICALS, 1903-1933 (1963), and HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND:
PArEmxs OF AmICAr NATSVISM, 1860-1925 (1955).
8 See ScuEMER, THE WILSON ADMNISTRATION AND Civ. LmERTms, 1917-1921(1960); PETmsoN & Frr OPPONENTS OF WAR, 1917-1918 (1957); and MumY, THE
RED ScARE: A STUDY I N NATIONAL HYsTERIA, 1919-1920 (1955).
9 For discussion see SwARD, THE LEGEND OF HENRY FORD (1948).
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paign. It brought a virtual carnival of bigotry displaying excessive
fundamentalism.10 Furthermore, there emerged "America's Experi-
ment": prohibition-perhaps the most accurate symbol of the repres-
sive twenties. To enforce "American morality," sumptuary laws
against drink put our Constitution in the position where it was re-
spected only in its breach. Disrespect for the law was widespread.
In terms of fundamental democratic values, the 1920's saw the
United States involved in a crisis. The issue was whether we would
emerge as a democratic nation from these shocks with the will of the
majority tempered by respect for minority rights, or whether we would
succumb to the lure of political hegemony through physical suppression
of powerless minorities.1 It is never easy for a community of true
believers, upholding "American morality," or any other creed, to allow
militant political and economic dissenters, or atheists, to urge their
"blasphemies." A 1925 example, described by John Roche, is illustra-
tive. It involved Carlo Tresca, an Italian syndicalist, who was sen-
tenced by a federal judge to an Atlanta prison for a year and a day
because Tresca published a two-line advertisement of a book on birth
control in his journal, Ii Martello."1 American civil liberty was caught
in the crucible of forced conformity.
Quite naturally, the hatreds arising from war and nativism made
themselves felt in the schools. They spurred many state legislatures to
pass laws forbidding the teaching of German or Russian, or, in some
cases, forbidding the teaching of foreign languages altogether. By 1923,
thirty-four states had laws on their books similar to Nebraska's which
prescribed that, "no person, individually or as a teacher, shall.., teach
any subject to any person in any language other than the English lan-
guage."1 Part XII of the Report of the Commission on The Social
Studies of The American Historical Association states that, "a marked
lack of uniformity in phraseology indicated spontaneous action of the
states in this matter rather than pressure by a national organization.""
It was against this background that, in 1931, the legislature of the
State of Washington enacted the first oath which recently was found
wanting by the Supreme Court of the United States. The "1931 oath"
10 See MooRE, A CATHOLIC RUNS FOR PRESIDENT: THE CAMPAIGN OF 1928 (1956),
and note RICE, THE Ku KLUX KLAN IN AM ERICAN POLITICS (1962).
11 ROCHE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 112.
11 Id. at 113.
11 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and 2 EMERSON & HABER, POLI-
TICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1050 (1958).
14 BEALE, ARE AMERICAN TEACHERS FREE? 333 (1936).
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provided that, "every professor, instructor or teacher" 5 must state
that:1 6
I solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the constitution and
laws of the United States of America and of the State of Washington,
and will by precept and example promote respect for the flag and the
institutions of the United States of America and the State of Washington,
reverence for law and order and undivided allegiance to the government
of the United States.
The underlying notion here is simply that of conformity-that of
requiring a professor to hold and promote certain legislatively approved
opinions, at the expense of free inquiry. This oath dictates that certain
notions should be taught, as well as how they should be taught. The
view is, "My country, right or wrong." Not my country, when it is
right, and, when wrong, to set it right.
The Washington law continued, stating that: "any contract exe-
cuted or renewed or [teaching] license issued in violation hereof shall
be and is hereby declared to be null and void."' 7 Thus, this oath law
operated automatically. It summarily discharged anyone who refused
to swear to its contents. There was no hearing afforded where a profes-
sor could explain or justify his refusal to sign, regardless of the merits
of his grounds. He either executed the oath, once every year, or he was
automatically fired. But immediate loss of employment was not the
only sanction behind the oath.
As is true with all oaths, there was a second, more mediate, sanction
behind both the "1931" and the "1955" oaths. It was the threat of a
criminal prosecution for perjury. This sanction, while more remote,
is more severe, for the maximum penalty in Washington for committing
perjury is punishment "by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for
not more than fifteen years."' The decision whether a faculty member
actually had committed perjury would most probably be made by a
local jury, well after the oaths were executed, and in a professor's case,
perhaps on evidence supplied by students who had sat in his classes.
The threat of a perjury prosecution, and conviction, is not so fanciful
as it once was. Given the continuing tensions of the cold war and the
rise of the American Radical Right," with its emphasis on "purifying"
the educational system, it appears that juries could now be empaneled
15 Section 2, Chapter 103, Laws of Washington (1931).
'
6 Section 1, Chapter 103, Laws of Washington (1931) ; RCW 28.70.150.
17Section 4, Chapter 103, Laws of Washington (1931).is RCW 9.72.010.
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much more disposed to convict for perjury. Prospects of a possible
conviction may have been in mind, when some witnesses, who had in the
early 1940's clearly denied any communist affiliations, found it wiser
during the 1950's in response to similar questions to plead their privi-
lege against self-incrimination." This trend toward nonsense anti-
communism is not remote, and the Supreme Court has observed that:
"it would be blinking reality not to acknowledge that there are some
among us always ready to affix a Communist label upon those whose
ideas they violently oppose."'"
Even though a conviction be unlikely, the mere hint of a criminal
prosecution is a sobering thought, fully enough to bring most people
into line. Reputation, financial standing, opportunities for job advance-
ment and social position are all at stake if a prosecution for falsely
swearing to one's loyalty is started, regardless of its outcome. Alexan-
der Hamilton saw this point clearly and also articulated the threat posed
by "loyalty oaths" to a free and open society when he said that "a
power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will."22
The potentialities described above are hardly conducive to promoting
that "sense of freedom" necessary in a university, and in a free society,
for creative thought which, by definition, must challenge all existing
orthodoxy. In such a situation the real result is, of course, an impair-
ment of the freedoms of speech and association, the core of which is
academic freedom. The sweep of recent events, and the rise of non-
sense anti-communism, not only has a clear and distinct message for
present faculty members, but also for our youth. The young must be
fearful that they do not commit youthful indiscretions, or become in-
volved in mistaken or misguided enthusiasms that later rise from their
pasts, like ghosts, to haunt their careers. They must not deviate; and
hence, they must play it safe.23 Fearing later condemnation, they prob-
19 See Bell, D., (ed.), THE RADICAL RIGHT (1963) ; SHERWIN, THE ExTREMISTS
(1963); ELLSWORTH & HARRIS, THE AMERICAN RIGHT WING (1962); SUALL, THE
AMERICAN ULTRAS (1962); FIRST NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF RIGHTIST GRouPs (1962);
GOULD, INSIDE THE BIRCH SociETY (1961), and consider the case of Professor
Koeninger reported in 49 A.A.U.P. Bull. 44 (1963), and LAZARSFELD & THILENS,
THE ACADEMIC MIND ch. 2 (1958).
20 Hearings Before the Subconnittee to Investigate the Administration of the
Internal Security Act of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subversive Infltence
in the Educational Process, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 553-54 (1953).
21 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 373 (1964).
22 THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 491 (Gideon ed. 1818).
23 Nor does it seem that college presidents are immune. Consider the case of Charles
H. Fisher, President of Western Washington College of Education, who was dismissed
after sixteen years of service. It appears that a committee of five citizens, including
the local Grand Dragon of the Ku-Klux-Klan, submitted to the Board of Trustees
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ably will shrink from associations, and therefore from speech and
thought, that might stir controversy.2" On the other hand, if they do
become entangled with a cause to the left of center, then their fears will
be similar to those already present in many of today's members of
society. They will fear a continuing surveillance of their activities, or
a combing of their pasts, or a cocking of ears, to catch all their words to
sift them for clues of dangerous thoughts and badges of disloyalty. In
short, loyalty oaths and their enforcement procedures, including the
threat of perjury prosecutions, cast a pall of orthodoxy over the class-
room. There can be no free speech, nor academic freedom in such a
situation. 5 "Where suspicion fills the air and holds scholars in line for
ten charges against President Fisher which, having a modern ring, indicated that
Fisher had allowed "numerous executives and members of subversive organizations,
and free love, atheistic and un-American pacifist organizations" to address the student
body "while pro-Americans have not appeared," and that he engaged in a "studied
avoidance of having Christian leaders address the student body... while some lec-
turers who have appeared have spoken flippantly of Christianity and have condemned
the American economic life." "The flag is seldom displayed on campus," and the
student newspaper rebuked the local papers that warned the public against subversive
activities. The Board of Trustees specifically dealt with each charge separately, and
finally concluded by endorsing President Fisher. However, three years later he was
dismissed by the same trustees without any additional reasons being given. It should
be noted that immediately after the trustees' first decision, the chairman of the citizens'
group appealed to Governor Martin who conferred with the Board before its second
decision. Reported in 27 A.A.U.P. Bull. 48 (1941).24 John Stuart Mill's classic point applies here: "[T]he peculiar evil of silencing
the expression of an opinion is that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as
the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those
who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging
error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer
perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error."
MILL, ON LiBzRTY 16 (Crofts Classics ed. 1947).
25 Consider the remarks of LAZARsFELD & THrELENS, THE AcADEmIc Mil 101
(1958) : "Men and women who opposed Communism may find it quite degrading if
they feel forced to reiterate their private convictions in order to satisfy suspicious
critics. While they agree with the condemnation of Communism, they fear they may
be setting a dangerous precedent on the broader issue of free expression of opinions.
If foreswearing heresy becomes general practice, they may someday find themselves in
a precarious position if they should deviate from the prevailing mood of the time. As a
result, professors often feel embarrassment and even guilt. They are not extremists,
but they dislike having to prove it."
In the years following World War II, when intellectual liberty has been so much
under attack, this study by Lazarsfeld and Thielens shows that: (a) 46% of the
teachers covered by their study felt "apprehensive" about their freedom to teach and
speak freely (id. at 84-85). But, significantly, a higher percentage, 54%, of those
without tenure felt the apprehension (id. at 240); (b) this "apprehension" put "a
noticeable damper on the activities and opinions" of these teachers (id. at 192);
(c) some teachers toned down their writings and did not fully express their full
convictions and thought in their writings and avoided assigning "controversial" refer-
ence works for discussion (id. at 197); (d) some teachers avoided controversial
subjects in the classroom (id. at 197) ; (e) for some, their relationships with students
were substantially impaired (id. at 204). This state of affairs ought to be com-
pared with Justice Frankfurter's view that ". . . the liberty of man to search for
truth ought not be fettered, no matter what orthodoxies he may challenge." Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 550 (1950).
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fear of their jobs, there can be no exercise of the free intellect."26 Fear
replaces the pursuit of knowledge with deadening doctrines, discussion
ends where it should begin, and "supineness and dogmatism take the
place of free inquiry.""
THE 1955 OATH
The second oath declared unconstitutional in Baggett v. Bullitt, the
"1955 oath," was of the disclaimer variety; that is, an affiant must
swear that he is not something, e.g., "subversive." It too flowed from
the aftermath of war and fear. This time the war was World War II,
and the fear was of communism. This oath also attacked free speech
and intellectual liberty.
In 1945, we were allied with the Soviet Union in a great war. Com-
munists were our friends, and we were linked together in a common
cause. There was much sympathy for the Russians who, heroically, had
withstood staggering war losses, perhaps 20,000,000 dead. We believed
Stalin no longer held the view that "capitalistic encirclement" was a
danger. The hope was that the Soviet Union would recognize our basic
decency, and we theirs, and that mutual accommodation and coopera-
tion would lead to the United Nations and a stable world without war.
But by 1946, a year later, an unhappy grey dawn glimmered in
American political consciousness. We slowly realized that time was
bringing trouble with the Soviet Union. Friendliness turned to suspi-
cion as Soviet espionage agents sought our atomic secrets. Stalin be-
trayed the Grand Alliance, and America, radiantly hopeful for a per-
manent peace, was rudely shocked by Soviet expansionism in Eastern
Europe, and, in 1950, by the invasion of South Korea. Additionally,
slumbering China had been awakened by communist hands and had
started to reveal her aggressive, expansionist policies, based on violence.
Obviously, something grievous had gone wrong. Why, within five
years after World War II, were we embroiled in a new international
crisis? Why were Americans fighting, and dying, in far off Asia? How
did the Soviets get the bomb so soon if it weren't for Russian spies in
high places? For many, the generally accepted answer to these, and
other hard questions, was all too easy: "Betrayal!" Betrayal at home
and abroadI The cold war was on, and it soon became bone-chilling.
As suspicion spread across America, the quest for internal and exter-
2 8 Douglas, J., in Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 510 (1951).
27 Ibid. For further discussion see Morris, Academic Freedom and Loyalty Oaths,
28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 487 (1963).
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nal security was renewed. Internally, the search was for domestic com-
munists-never a significant force in the mainstream of American
politics. Nevertheless, in the minds of some, the infectious "communist-
liberal" heresy had to be stamped out, or controlled, and the men in
power turned to loyalty-security programs.
Few Americans are fully aware of an amazing network which, with
an alarming vitality, has spread throughout American society. 5 Loy-
alty-security programs have proliferated to all levels, and programs are
currently being administered by federal," state,"0 local,3" and private
agencies. 2 These programs are all recent newcomers to our social
scene. 3 Loyalty-security measures have multiplied with startling rapid-
ity and can be found almost everywhere.3" "By 1956 no less than forty-
two states, and more than two thousand county and municipal subdivi-
sions and state and local administrative commissions required loyalty
oaths from teachers, voters, lawyers, union officials, residents in public
housing, recipients of public welfare, and, in Indiana, wrestlers." 5 The
most exhaustive study of one aspect of the total problem-loyalty tests
as a condition of employment-declares that "the record of the last
decade, however, suggests strongly that the hardest thing to do with
loyalty programs is to confine them."3" The official programs date only
from President Truman's 1947 loyalty order for federal employees;
and, if legislative investigations are discounted, that event marks the
2 Not counting legislative investigations, it appears that loyalty tests have been
prescribed as conditions of employment by the federal government for federal civil
servants, government contractors and their employees, the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, the Defense Department, certain other military personnel, labor leaders, unclassi-
fied researchers, and licensed seamen. See BRowN, LOYALTY AND SECUERIT 21-119,
164-83 (1958).
29 See BONTECOU, THE FEDERAL LOYALTY SEcuRr PRoGRAM (1953); also see
YAosLINsXY, CASE STUDIES IN PERSONNEL SEcuRITY (1955).
30 See GELTHORN, THE STATES AND SUBVERSION (1952) ; FUND FOR THE REP BLIC,
DIGEST OF THE PUBLIC REcoRD OF COMmUNISm IN THE UNITED STATES, PART II,
STATE STATUTES AND DEasioNs (1955), and Prendergast, State Legislatures and
Communism, 44 Am. POL. Scr. REV. 556 (1950).
"'E.g., Garner v. Board of Pub. Wks., 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
32 See INDUSTRaL RELTIONS RESEARcH ASSOCrATiON, PERSONNEL SEcURrrY PRO-
GRAMS IN U.S. INDUSTRY (1955); Comment, 77Te Role of Employer Practices in the
Federal Industrial Personnel Security Program, 8 STAN. L. REv. 234 (1956), and
Comment, Loyalty and Private Employment, 62 YAs.E L. J. 954 (1953).3 3 Employment tests are very little discussed in the standard historical works, but
see HYmAN, To TRY MEN'S SOULS: LOYALTY TESTS IN ArmRIcAN HISTORY (1959) ;
HYMAN, ERA OF THE OATH: NORTHERN LOYALTY TESTS DURING THE CIVIL WAR
Am RECONSTRUCTION (1954); and MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND
SEDITION Acts (1951).
84 See BRowN, LOYALTY AND SECURITY 118 (1958), and GELLHoRN, in his useful
book, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS 129-30 (1956) reports
that Washington requires a loyalty oath of its veterinarians.
35 HYMAN, op. cit. supra note 33, at 338.3 6 BRowN, op. cit. supra note 34, at 338.
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beginning of recent large-scale attempts to measure a man's loyalty as
a condition of his employment."'
The total overall impact of loyalty-security programs on our free
institutions has yet to be measured, but it must be staggering. It will
suffice to consider the implications of one example, confined solely to
loyalty as a test of employment. As of 1958, reliable and cautious
estimates revealed that a few more than 1,600,000 professional people
(scientists, teachers, lawyers, engineers, and so on) had occupations
dependent upon their ability to meet some type of loyalty criteria. Add
to these the over 72 million people in federal, state, and local govern-
ment, plus the astonishing figure of over 4y million people who must
meet industrial security tests, and these figures total over 13r million.
Applied to a work force of 65 million, this estimate "means that at
least one person out of five, as a condition of his current employment,
has taken a test oath, or completed a loyalty statement, or achieved
official security clearance or survived some undefined private scru-
tiny." More importantly, it appears that about 11,500 people, the
largest single group involved in federal contracts in private employ-
ment, for one reason or another, have failed their loyalty tests. Hence,
loyalty qualifications appear to have barred from employment one per-
son in every 2,500."9 When applied to teachers and limited to state and
municipal governments, it is estimated that approximately 500 teachers
(school and college) were dismissed between 1948 and 1958, mostly for
refusals to answer questions or to take loyalty oaths as conditions of
employment. ° The proliferation of loyalty-security measures, and their
impact on dissent, leads one seriously to consider whether America is
approaching an era of orthodoxy.
A general error of those men who prescribe loyalty oaths as the
appropriate means of dealing with communism is that they confuse
loyalty with mere orthodoxy. 1 Being negatively defined as anti-
communism, this concept of "loyalty" suffers from a provincial
myopia.2 There has been a shift to negativism, and it reveals a terrible
37 Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (1947), superseded by Exec. Order
No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953). For commentary, see Emerson & Helfeld,
Loyalty Among Governmentt Employees, 58 YALE L. J. 14 (1948).
38 BROWN, op. cit. supra note 34, at 181.
39 Id. at 182.
40 Id. at 488 (Appendix A).
41 See Mundt, The Case for the McCarran Act, in SELECTED READINGS, LOYALTY
IN A DEMOCRATIC STATE 69 (Amherst College ed. 1952), and compare Truman, The
Internal Security Act: Veto Message, id. at 77.
42 See BARTH, THE LOYALTY OF FREE MEN (1951). The theme of a multiplicity
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fear and distrust of pluralism and an open society; it is an expression
of the insecurity of our times. Today, anti-communism is dangerously
becoming as doctrinaire as communism itself-and may come to em-
brace the root evil of totalitarianism, intolerance. Inherent in the
anti-communist definition of "loyalty" is the notion that dissent and
cultural diversity can no longer be broadly tolerated. The boundary
line between vigorous dissent and communism has become shadowy.
This dividing line and the tensions it develops are further aggravated
by oaths.," The reason is that, in their zeal to be sure that they have
dealt fully with the problem, state legislatures have cast their loyalty-
oath definitions of anti-communism into loose and general terms. Thus,
the net of orthodoxy is spread broadly over our society." However, as
Thomas Jefferson carefully pointed out, toleration of error is the in-
escapable condition for the pursuit of truth.
It appears that a simple truth remains to be learned; namely, that,
in a profound sense, loyalty to country is like love, and cannot be
created by legislation, compulsion or force. Loyalty must arise spon-
taneously from the hearts of people who love their country and respect
their government, because this land of ours offers freedom, justice and
opportunity for all. Loyalty oaths contradict this fundamental view.
Needless to say, they are ineffective; they do not catch communists, but
instead, they trip up men of principle."5
A long time was needed to arrive at the conclusion that governmental
coercion of opinion is a mistake, and, even today, only part of the world
of loyalties is capably analyzed in GRODZINs, THE LOYAL AND THE DISLOYAL: SOcrAL
BOUNDARIES OF PATRIOTISM AND TREASON (1956).4 3 Two examples from LAzAesEr.L & THIELENS, THE ACADEMIC MIND (1958),
illustrate the way in which oaths invade and intimidate professors. At 223 they report
an interview as follows.
"'In the present state of affairs, I won't join any political group. Almost any group
that is trying to protect what it thinks is civil liberties, I think could end up on the
Attorney General's list. I know for a fact that in the past contributions by check to
certain organizations were photographed, and it goes on now. I send no checks to such
things.'"
And the other example:
"In explaining his avoidance of political organizations, a respondent who grew up
in Nazi Germany saw a parallel between the current scene and the experiences of
his youth:
"'I don't belong to any and I would be very hesitant to join any. I learned this
in Germany in high school. Never join any group at all. This isn't a case of lack
of interest, but experience that something might turn against you, because in ten years
if you join any organization someone might say this was subversive.'
44 SSTouFTER, COMMUNISM AND CIvIL Li EmRs (1955).
45 Consider the evidence found by Byse, A Report On The Peinsylvania Loyalty
Act, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 480, 482-3, n. 5 (1953), and the statements made respectively
by Messrs. Cramp and Sweezy in Cramp v. Florida, 368 U.S. 278 (1962) ; Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1956); and also, Record, pp. 189-219, Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
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is convinced. Nevertheless, that conclusion, embodied in our Constitu-
tion, is one of the most important ever reached by man. The two ideas
that respect and loyalty will ultimately be given to a government only
so long as it deserves respect and loyalty, and that opposition to govern-
mental abuses is not to be considered treason, have made our country
tolerant of opposition based on differences of opinion that in other parts
of the world have kept the hangman busy. The American constitutional
tradition is eternally hostile to every form of tyranny over the mind of
man, in both the realm of reason and that of conscience. The use of
"loyalty oaths" or other devices for the forced extraction by govern-
ment of men's beliefs, opinions or acts is incompatible with a free
society. Those persons who equate loyalty with conformity misconceive
the American constitutional tradition.46
But, the fact is that the years following World War II witnessed the
rise of another hysteria: professional anti-communism. They saw the
ascent of congressional investigating committees such as the House's
Un-American Activities Committee47 and the Senate's Internal Security
Committee.48 The Democratic Party was branded the "party of trea-
son." And, coincidentally, this time marked the beginning of television.
Thus, one smash hit after another of committee investigations was
brought into the living rooms of America. Senator Joseph McCarthy
took after a dentist named Peress, and invented the term "Fifth
Amendment Communist" for recalcitrant witnesses. He suggested that
every person who "took the Fifth" was a potential Alger Hiss.49
Not to be outdone by the federal government, many state legislatures,
notably Washington, Maryland, and California, 0 created their own
"Un-American Activities Committees." They, too, wanted to ferret out
46 That tradition was pithily summarized by Mr. Justice Holmes in Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, at 630:
Persecution for the expression of opinion seems to me perfectly logical. If you have
no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your
heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition...
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market.... That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.
47 See CARR, THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN AcvTIrIF (1952), and
DONNER, THE UN-AmERICANS (1961).
48 BARTH, GOVERNMENT BY INVESTIGATION (1955) and TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST
(1955).
49 The definitive biography of Senator McCarthy, and analysis of his tactics, is by
RoVERE, SENATOR JOE McCARTHY (1959).




communists, and, predictably, the college campus became the target for
stamping out the "communist-liberal" heresy. These years took an
awesome toll of academic freedom.5 1
The pressures on our universities and colleges intensified during this
period, producing new forces for othodoxy and a spate of attacks on
academic freedom. 2 The American Association of University Profes-
sors during 1945 to 1950, considered 227 cases involving academic
freedom, not counting many "situations," which are not classified as
cases." During the decade of the fifties, legislative investigations
heavily taxed academic freedom, frequently precipitating dismissals
from university faculties, or nonrenewals of term appointments that
otherwise would have been granted." Nineteen cases involving legisla-
tive hearings have been reported, and they usually have concerned a
faculty member who refused to answer a question, thereby stimulating
the employing institution to undertake action that ultimately led to his
51 See Taylor, 7e Disnissal of Fifth Amendment Professors, 300 Annals 79 (1955);
TAYLOR, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE IN THE QUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
(1956); and BARTH, THE LOYALTY OF FREE MEN, ch. 9 (1951); and see, MACIVER,
ACADEMIC FREEDoM IN OUR TIME (1955).
52 See, e.g., The Lines of Attack on Academic Freedom, Part III, of MAcIvER,
op. cit. supra note 51, at 123-205; GREATER PHILADELPHIA BRANCH, ACLU, ACADEMIC
FREEOM: SOME RECENT PHILADELPHIA EPISODES (1954), and Note, 42 A.A.U.P.
BULL. 75 (1956).
S3 Report of Committee T, 37 A.A.U-P. BULL. 79 (1951). For full discussion of the
attacks and their aftermath at the University of Washington, see BRowN, LOYALTY
AND SECURITY 120-22 (1958), COUNTRYMAN, UN-AmERIcAN Acrv'rs IN THE STATE
OF WASHINGTON (1951) and BOARD OF REGENTS, UNVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, COM-
uNxsm AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM (1949). For the California situation, see STEWART,
THE YEAR OF THE OATH (1950) ; Tolman v. Underhill, 229 P2d 447 (Cal. App. 1951),
and KANTOROWITz, THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE, DOCUMENTS AND MARGINAL NOTES ON
THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOYALTY OATH (1950), and note generally CAUGHEY,
IN CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER (1958). These materials do not speak fully to the
intimidations which were generated.
54 See chapter 2 of LAZARSFELD & TH NIss, THE AcADEnc MIND (1958). As the
case of Professor Rupert C. Koeninger demonstrates, the technique of failing to recom-
mend reappointment is not confined to the younger faculty members. It appears that,
because of certain political activities, and after fourteen years of service to Sam
Houston State Teachers College, Professor Koeninger's name, on May 4-6, 1961, was
not among those recommended for reappointment to the institution. The political
activities charged to Professor Koeninger seem to have consisted of (1) delivering a
keynote address on "The First Year of Integration" before a meeting of the Southern
Conference Educational Fund; (2) helping to set up booths to collect money for
the payment of poll taxes; (3) signing a petition, using the title "professor" which
endorsed a candidate for judicial office; (4) questioning a congressman, at an open
meeting, about his reasons for voting to uphold a presidential veto of a bill; (5) en-
gaging in "a political hassle" with a student, and (6) disputing the veracity of the film
"Operation Abolition" three weeks prior to the board meeting at which he was not
rehired. For more discussion see 49 A.A.U.P. BULL. 44 (1963). Among other things,
Professor Koeninger's situation illustrates the need for a functioning system of tenure.
See BYsE & JOUGHIN, TENURE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION (1959), Byse, Aca-
demic Freedom, Tenure, and the Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 304 (1959).
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dismissal." In some of the cases, it is true, faculty members, as well as
the administrations,56 were at fault; nevertheless, this fact does not
diminish the impact of the investigations on the "spirit of freedom," so
essential to an academic community, and a free society. In addition,
there were fourteen dismissals from New York City municipal colleges"
under a law which later was found to be unconstitutional.58 Further-
more, in 1953, R. E. Combs, counsel to the California Senate Committee
on Un-American Activities, testified that a number of college and uni-
versity presidents in California had arranged for "clearance" from the
state committee of all new appointees to their faculties, and privately to
receive "derogatory information" regarding their present staffs."
The dominant mood of frustration, suspicion and fear was well ex-
pressed in the 1947 resolution setting up the State of Washington's Un-
American Investigating Committee:
WHEREAS, these are times of public danger; subversive persons and
groups are endangering our domestic unity, so as to leave us unprepared
to meet aggression, and under cover afforded by the Bill of Rights these
persons and groups seek to destroy our liberties and our freedom by
force, threats and sabotage, and to subject us to the domination of foreign
powers .... 60
This, then, was the controlling quality of the political atmosphere in the
State of Washington, now only a remnant of the past, when its Com-
mittee focused upon the University campus for an investigation of the
faculty.
The details of that drab and sordid affair need not be recorded here.
They have been the subject of a book by Professor Vern Countryman
of the Harvard Law School, Un-American Activities in the State of
Washington. On page 396, after a full review of the Committee's work,
Professor Countryman concludes:
The resolution which created the Canwell committee authorized it to
"investigate . .. individuals, groups or organizations whose activities
are such as to indicate a purpose to foment internal strife, discord and
55 See Brief for the AAUP as Amicus Curiae, Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S.
109 (1959).
56 For expression of concern that university administrators are doing less than they
ought, see GOODMAN, THE COMMUNITY OF SCHOLARS (1962).
57 See 42 A.A.U.P. BULL. 71 (1956). See, e.g., Daniman v. Board of Educ., 306
N.Y. 532, 119 N.E.2d 373 (1954).58 Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1955).
59 Supra note 20, at 605-22; and see Gerstel, G-Men on. the CampMs, The Nation,
Jan. 30, 1954, p. 93.




dissension; infiltrate and undermine the stability of our American insti-
tutions; confuse and mislead the people; and impede the normal progress
of our state and nation." On this record, the only activities which clearly
indicate the proscribed purpose are those of the Canwell committee and
some of its supporters.
Suffice it to say that only ten members of the University of Washing-
ton faculty, then over 700 full-time members, were named, but not
proved, as being, or having been, members of the Communist Party.'1
No one was shown to be a "disloyal" or "subversive" American in the
sense of advocating violence or espionage, or seeking to undermine
American institutions. Nevertheless, the University, by independent
investigation, conducted well before the Washington committee re-
ported to the legislature, carefully examined the records of the ten
professors who had been named. It dismissed three of them for having
been members of the Communist Party, and the rest were cleared."3
The Washington Un-American Activities Committee reported to the
state legislature in January of 1949, but there was no action on the com-
mittee's proposals. It was not until 1951 that legislation was enacted,
and then only after Governor Langlie had advised the legislature:
[I]n light of the grave emergency which we now face, additional action
must be taken immediately. . . We also must be mindful of that small
group of traitors within our citizenry who would destroy our freedom
from within. In this connection I strongly urge that the legislature give
thought to enactment of appropriate provisions for the curbing of sub-
versive activity, and to protect our free institutions from perversions into
weapons of aggression against us in the hands of our enemies. 63
The 1951 legislature passed the Washington Subversive Activities
Act, " directly modeled after Maryland's Ober Act"5 which has been
enacted in many other states. The Washington Act made it a crime on
penalty of a $10,000 fine and/or ten years in prison, to be a "subversive
person," or a member of a "subversive organization," or "foreign sub-
versive organization," including the Communist Party. It provides gen-
erally that "[N]o subversive person, as defined in this Act, shall be
61 See JOINT LEGISLATIVE FAcT-FINDING ComrnTEr ON UN-AMERIcAN AcTVTEs
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, SECOND REPRT (1948).
62 See CoMMUNIsM AND AcADE M c FREnom: THE RECORD OF THE TENUIE CASES
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON (1949).
63 House Journal of the Thirty-Second Legislature of the State of Washington, pp
23 and 30 (1951).
64 Chapter 254, Laws of Washington, 1951; RCW 9.81.65ANN. CODE OF MD. art. 85A (1957).
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eligible for employment in, or appointment to, any office,... of any
county, municipality, or other political subdivision of this state." Also,
it required a disclaimer oath that every state employee swear that he is
not a "subversive person," and if the employee should refuse, then he
"shall immediately be discharged." This Act was amended in 195566 to
require that all state employees also swear that they were not members
of "subversive organizations," "foreign subversive organizations" or
the Communist Party. The term "subversive person" was defined as
follows:
"Subversive person" means any person who commits, attempts to com-
mit, or aids in the commission, or advocates, abets, advises or teaches by
any means any person to commit, attempt to commit, or aid in the com-
mission of any act intended to overthrow, destroy, or alter, or to assist
in the overthrow, destruction or alteration of, the constitutional form of
the government of the United States, or of the State of Washington, or
any political subdivision of either of them by revolution, force or violence;
or who with knowledge that the organization is an organization as
described in subsection (2) or (3) hereof, becomes or remains a member
of a subversive organization or a foreign subversive organization.
The designations "subversive organization" and "foreign subversive
organization" were defined in similar terms and were of similar lengths.
These two enactments were the sources of the "1955 disclaimer oath,"
applicable to the faculty at the University of Washington.
Within weeks after passage of the amending oath statute, in the
summer of 1955, two members of the faculty, Max Savelle and Howard
Nostrand, challenged this measure on the grounds that it violated their
constitutional rights under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States. The "1931 oath" was
not attacked. They said: "Our great and compelling reason for chal-
lenging this issue is that it represents a frightening assumption by the
state for controlling and regulating thought, both in the minds of indi-
viduals and in the University."
A.C.L.U. attorneys prepared the case, an injunction was obtained
against the application of the oath law to the faculty, and, by spring of
1957, a trial court had declared that the oath laws violated the Wash-
ington State constitution. But, the State Attorney General appealed
that decision to the Washington State Supreme Court. In January 1959
the State Supreme Court issued an opinion reversing the lower court and
66 Chapter 377, Laws of Washington, 1955; RCW 9.81.010.
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upholding the constitutionality of the oath law over all objections,
except for the section allowing the use of the United States Attorney
General's list." This time Professors Nostrand and Savelle appealed
the case, for the first time, to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The case was argued before the Supreme Court on March 30, 1960,
but that Court rendered no substantive decision. During the oral argu-
ment a new issue arose: whether or not the oath law could be con-
strued by the State Supreme Court as offering a hearing at which a pro-
fessor "can explain or defend his refusal to take the oath."8 Conse-
quently, the case was sent back to the Washington Supreme Court for
an answer.
In April of 1961 the state court issued its second opinion holding
that the oath statutes, themselves, made no provision for such a hearing.
But, the court also stated that tenured professors were entitled to a
hearing before discharge because a hearing was part of the tenure code
of the University of Washington, and the tenure code was part of a
tenured professor's contract of employment." It should be noted that
the only question to be decided at such a hearing would be whether or
not the professor executed the oath. The reason for such a limited in-
quiry lay in the absolute mandatory nature of the law which disallowed
the existence of any possible grounds which would excuse one from
executing the oath. The case again was appealed to the Supreme Court
of the United States, and again, it refused to pass on the substantive
merits of the position put forth by Professors Savelle and Nostrand.
Over two dissents, the Supreme Court, on January 22, 1962, "dismissed
[the case] for want of a substantial federal question.""0 Evidently, the
Court thought there was nothing left to decide until after a hearing had
been held.
Once this decision became known, the local chapter of the American
Association of University Professors went on record supporting further
efforts to obtain a clear ruling on the constitutional merits of Washing-
ton's oath laws. A new case, Baggett v. Bullitt, was prepared by
A.C.L.U. lawyers, this time at the behest of sixty professors who were
plaintiffs; some were tenured, and others non-tenured, and the latter
were not entitled to a hearing under the tenure code. On June 6, 1962,
67 Nostrand v. Balmer, 53 Wn2d 460; 335 P2d 10 (1959).
68 Nostrand v. Little, 362 U.S. 474 (1960).69 Nostrand v. Little, 58 Wn2d 111; 361 P2d 551 (1961), noted 37 WAsH. L. REV.
106.7 0 Nostrand v. Little, 368 U.S. 436 (1962).
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this class action, praying for a declaration of rights and an injunction,
was filed in the United States District Court.7' It challenged both the
"1931" and the "1955" oaths. On February 9, 1963, a three-judge fed-
eral court"2 issued its opinion upholding Washington's oath law over all
constitutional objections.78 For the third time, counsel filed an appeal
to the Supreme Court of the United States, and on June 1, 1964, the
Court decided the case by the conclusive vote of seven to two.'
Counsel presented a broadly based attack on the two oaths. One of
the arguments was that all oaths in general, and the Washington oaths
in particular, constituted a prior restraint" on the exercise of the free-
dom of expression which, in a university context, amounted to a prior
restraint on academic freedom." Testimony showed that the professors
believed that if they subscribed to the two oaths, and honestly carried
out their commitments under the oaths, then, they would be required to
modify, or abridge, in some way, the truth as they saw it, or they would
be required to inject irrelevant materials into their teaching. For, what
is it that a professor of Russian, Mongolian or African History is sup-
posed to do in his classes in order to display that he is not "subversive,"
or in order to "promote respect for the flag and the institutions of the
United States?" The solution to this problem is even less clear in the
case of a professor of mathematics or physics, and is far more compli-
cated in the case of a professor of American Foreign Policy or Inter-
national Relations or Social Philosophy. But whatever the action re-
quired to comply with the oaths, it is clear, that it would be a restraint
on intellectual liberty.
The prior restraint objection is by far the most critical, and the most
telling. It is based on the fact that these two oaths, and indeed, all test
oaths prescribe that certain political and social beliefs and attitudes
must be acted upon. Professors, under "loyalty oaths," are forbidden
to teach or to discuss certain doctrines, irrespective of their truths, and
the University of Washington was forbidden to employ believers in
71 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 (1958), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958), R.v.
STAT. § 1979 (1875).
72 Convened under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284 (1958).
73 Baggett v. Bullitt, 215 F.Supp. 439 (1963).
'7 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
75 See, e.g., Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PROBs. 648 (1955) ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) ; and Talley v. California
362 U.S. 60 (1960).
71 See, Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1956) and comments by Murphy,
Academic Freedom-An Emerging Constitutional Right, 28 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PRoBS. 447 (1963) and Morris, Academic Freedom and Loyalty Oaths, 28 LAW AND
CoNTE8.. PROBS. 487 (1963).
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certain political or economic creeds. Thus, "loyalty oaths" present
great dilemmas to the academic community, and to a free society as a
whole, for, in fact, they prevent the academic community, and society,
from following the paths of free inquiry which are at the very heart of
its being. If a professor abides by thought-conforming and action-con-
forming "loyalty oaths," he ceases to be involved in a truly free intel-
lectual endeavor of his own creation. To the extent he complies, a
faculty member denies the integrity of his calling. On the other hand,
if a professor refuses to sign, or disobeys his oath and carries out his
professorial calling, then he is either fired, or he is a lawbreaker, or
perhaps both.
The requirement, by a state, that its University professors and re-
searchers execute a loyalty oath, as a condition of their employment,
reflects a basic misunderstanding of the educational process. It is idle
to shirk the fundamental issue involved, for upon its resolution turns
the course of education itself. The fundamental cleavage is simply this;
there can be no agreement between those people who regard education
solely as a means of instilling and propagating certain definite and
approved beliefs, and those other people who think that, above all else,
education should produce a disciplined and critical mind with the power
of independent judgment, capable of choosing his own beliefs and
values."
77Compare CrAFEE, THE BLESISNGS OF LiBERTy 241 n.2 (1956): "The govern-
ment pays judges, but it does not tell them how to decide. An independent ... univer-
sity is as essential to the community as an independent judiciary."
A direct attack upon academic freedom, and upon meaningful education itself, has
been mounting. This is evidenced by the following statute. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 230.23
(1961) :
Americanism vs. communism: required high school course.-1. The legislature of
the state hereby finds it to be a fact that:
a. The political ideology commonly known and referred to as communism is in
conflict with and contrary to the principles of constitutional government of the
United States as epitomized in its national constitution.
b. The successful exploitation and manipulation of youth and student groups
throughout the world today are a major challenge which free world forces must
meet and defeat, and
c. The best method of meeting this challenge is to have the youth of the state
and nation thoroughly and completely informed as to the evils, dangers and
fallacies of communism by giving them a thorough understanding of the entire
communist movement, including its history, doctrines, objectives and techniques.
2. The public high schools shall each teach a complete course of not less than
thirty hours, to all students enrolled in said public high schools entitled 'American-
ism versus communism.'
3. The course shall provide adequate instruction in the history, doctrines, objec-
tives and techniques of communism and shall be for the primary purpose of instilling
in the minds of the students a greater appreciation of democratic processes, freedom
under law, and the will to preserve that freedom.
4. The course shall be one of orientation in comparative governments and shall
emphasize the free-enterprise-competitive economy of the United States as the one
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In addition to the prior restraint contention, counsel also argued"8
that the two Washington oaths could not be justified under the first
amendment's balancing test,7" nor under its clear and present danger
test.8" Besides abridging religious freedom,8" and the constitutional
right not to speak,82 counsel urged that these oaths constituted bills of
attainder," and that they violated the fourteenth amendment's guar-
antee of "due process" because their execution constituted the first step
of an unconstitutional series,s" and because they operated automatically
and capriciously without affording any hearing."
which produces higher wages, higher standards of living, greater personal freedom
and liberty than any other system of economics on earth.
5. The course shall lay particular emphasis upon the dangers of communism, the
ways to fight communism, the evils of communism, the fallacies of communism, and
the false doctrines of communism.
6. The state textbook committee and the state board of education shall take such
action as may be necessary and appropriate to prescribe suitable textbook and in-
structional material as provided by state law, using as one of its guides the official
reports of the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the Senate Internal
Security Sub-committee of the United States Congress.
7. No teacher or textual material assigned to this course shall present communism
as preferable to the system of constitutional government and the free-enterprise-
competitive economy indigenous to the United States.
8. The course of study hereinabove provided for shall be taught in all of the public
high schools of the state no later than the school year commencing in September
1962.
In 1962, Louisiana passed a similar statute directing the state department of educa-
tion, in conjunction with the local school systems, to conduct seminars for "certain
teachers and eleventh and twelfth grade high school students.. . ." The purpose of
the seminars is to give their participants "a clear understanding of the fundamental
principles of the American form of government, the evils of socialism and the basic
philosophy of communism and the strategy and tactics used by the Communists in
their efforts to achieve their ultimate goal of world domination." The statute does
not say who the seminar teachers will be, nor what materials shall be used. See
LA. STAT. ANN. R.S. §§ 2851, 2852. For accounts of more subtle attacks on academic
freedom, see NELSON & ROBERTS, THE CENSORS AND THE ScHooLs (1963).
78 See Brief for Appellants, p. 48-215 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
79 For oaths, the basic case is American Communication Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382 (1950), and compare, Frantz, The First Amendment In The Balance, 71 YALE
L. J. 1424 (1962) With Mendelson, On The Meaning of The First Amendment:
Absolutes In The Balance, 50 CALIF. L. Ray. 821 (1962) and the reply by Frantz,
Is The First Amendment Law?-A Reply To Professor Mendelson, 51 CALIF. L.
REV. 729 (1963).
80 See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298 (1957) ; Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) ; Noto v. United
States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961) ; Communist Party v. S.A.C.B., 367 U.S. 1 (1961) ; and
Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
81 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
82 See West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
83 See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 277 (1867); Ex parte Garland,
71 U.S. (4 Wall) 333 (1867) ; United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) ; Ameri-
can Communication Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), and Comment, The Bounds
of Legislative Specifications, 72 YALE L. J. 333 (1962).
84 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). Compare Konigsberg v. California,
366 U.S. 36 (1961), and see Kalven & Steffan, The Bar Admission Cases, 21 LAw iN
TRANSITION 155 (1961).
85 Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
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The oath form applying the "1931" and "1955" oaths required that
the affiant "understand that this statement and oath are made subject
to the penalties of perjury," that he had read the two Washington oaths,
and "that I understand and am familiar with the contents thereof."
Given these provisions and the broad definitions of "subversive," coun-
sel contended that the two Washington oaths were unduly vague and
incapable of objective measurement; therefore, it was argued, they
failed to meet the requirements of the fourteenth amendment."8 The
Court has long held that no state legislature can constitutionally pass
"a law forbidding or requiring conduct in language which is so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application... 287 This doctrine condemning indefi-
niteness, primarily has been used by the Supreme Court to create an
insulating buffer zone for the added peripheral protection of civil liber-
ties, particularly freedom of speech."8 The Court viewed this doctrine
as a vehicle for disposing of Baggett v. Bullitt, holding that the vice of
unconstitutional vagueness was common to both of the Washington
oaths. All other arguments were left for another day.
In his Opinion for the Court, Mr. Justice White, writing for a ma-
jority of seven, noted that the definitional language of the "1955 oath,"
quoted above, 9 was extremely broad: "A person is subversive not only
if he himself commits the specified acts but if he abets or advises
another in aiding a third person to commit an act which will assist yet
a fourth person in the overthrow of constitutional government.190 For
the majority, the "susceptibility of the statutory language to require
foreswearing of an undefined variety of 'guiltless knowing behavior"'
made the "1955" disclaimer oath "unduly vague, uncertain and broad,"
and unconstitutional on its face." The "1931" oath of undivided alle-
giance met the same fate.2 In essence, the Court held that a
State may not require one to choose betveen subscribing to an unduly
vague and broad oath, thereby incurring the likelihood of prosecution,
and conscientiously refusing to take the oath with the consequent loss
of employment, and perhaps profession, particularly where 'the free dis-
semination of ideas may be the loser.'98
sC6Under the holding of Cramp v. Florida, 368 U.S. 278 (1962).87 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367 (1964) ; Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495 (1952) and Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
88 See Amsterdam, The Void For Vagueness Doctrine In The Supreme Court, 109
U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960), and Baggett v. Bullitt, supra note 87, at 372.
89 See text following note 66 supra.
90 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367 (1964).9 1 Id. at 368. 92 Id. at 371. 93 Id. at 374.
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Baggett v. Bullitt is highly important because it explicitly recognizes
another dimension to the void for vagueness doctrine. The new notion,
foreshadowed by the Cramp v. Florida" requirement that an oath be
"susceptible of objective measurement,"9 is that of "guiltless knowing
behavior." To see this constitutional requirement in its loyalty oath
context, it will be necessary to review several oath cases, recognizing the
power of an oath to deter free expression.
The first case in which the Supreme Court of the United States wrote
an opinion on the constitutionality of a modern disclaimer oath was
American Communication Association v. Douds9 The Taft-Hartley
Act of 1947 provided, inter alia, that a union could have lawful access
to the National Labor Relations Board only if each officer had previ-
ously filed two items: (1) a non-communist affidavit and (2) a dis-
claimer oath that he neither believed himself, nor was a member, or a
supporter, of any organization that believed in, or taught, the forceful
overthrow of government. Several unions and union officers attacked
these provisions, arguing that they violated certain constitutional rights.
Among other contentions was one that the oath was unconstitutionally
vague.
The Court disposed of the void for vagueness contention in two para-
graphs." It noted that "the constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite
statute is the injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an
offense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning."98 But, this
vice did not reside in the oath, the Court held, because, under the
federal perjury statute,9 criminal punishment could be applied only to
false statements made "knowingly and willfully." "A mind intent upon
willful evasion is inconsistent with surprised innocence."'0 0 Thus, the
presence of scienter in the federal perjury statute was looked upon as
removing the vagueness from the oath's penalty provision; it meant that
punishment for false swearing was "restricted to acts done with knowl-
edge that they contravene the statute [oath]."'1 Scienter, it was held,
removed "the possibility of constitutional infirmity.'. 2
Garner v. Board of Public Works.. was the first case in which the
94 Cramp v. Florida, 368 U.S. 278 (1962). 95 Id. at 286.
96 339 U.S. 382 (1950). 97 Id. at 412-13. 98 Id. at 413.
99 Criminal Code § 35(A), 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1958).
'o American Communication Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 413 (1950).
101 Ibid.
10 2 Id. at 413 (emphasis supplied).
103341 U.S. 716 (1951). An earlier case, Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341
U.S. 56 (1951), was disposed of per curiam. It applied to political office seekers
and no argument of unconstitutional vagueness is reported.
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Court wrote an opinion on the constitutional power of a state to condi-
tion employment on the execution of a modern disclaimer oath. Califor-
nia required that every employee (1) execute an affidavit stating
whether he was a member of the Communist Party, and (2) take an
oath that he did not, nor was he "a member of or affiliated with any
group, society, association, organization or party which advises or
teaches" the forceful overthrow of government. It was argued that, on
its face, this oath was vague in that it did not require scienter. In short,
the contention was that California's oath denied due process "because
its negation is not limited to affiliations with organizations known to
the employee to be in the proscribed class."'' But, this argument did
not prevail. The Court upheld the California oath over the argument
of unconstitutional vagueness stating: "We assume scienter is implicit
in each clause of the oath." 0 5
Thus, Douds was underscored by Garner. A holding that an oath
was unconstitutionally vague seemed to turn exclusively upon the mere
presence or absence of scienter. Its presence removed any possibility
of the vice of vagueness from a disclaimer oath. This distinction be-
came "decisive" in Wieman v. Updegraff.'00 In that case, the Court was
confronted with an oath cast in language very similar to the California
oath in Garner. It was also prescribed by Oklahoma as a condition of
employment. A decision by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma had to "be
viewed as holding that knowledge is not a factor under the Oklahoma
statute.'M0 7 Thus, scienter was no part of the oath. The Court, first
noting that membership may be innocent, "a state servant may have
joined a proscribed organization unaware of its activities and pur-
poses,"'08 went on to hold that Oklahoma's oath violated due process
requirements because "indiscriminate classification of innocent with
knowing activity must fall as an assertion of arbitrary power." '
At this juncture, it seems that the Court had developed two positions,
one for federal oaths and the other for state oaths, and both involved
scienter. The Douds view, regarding federal statutes, was simply that
of upholding a disclaimer oath over an argument of unconstitutional
vagueness, on a pari materia construction, if scienter was present in the
perjury statute. Knowledge need not have been part of the oath itself.
Obviously, this view does not take into account the impact of loyalty
104 Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 723 (1951).
.05 Id. at 724.
1o 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952). 108 Ibid.
10 7 Id. at 190. 109 Id. at 191.
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oath sanctions other than perjury prosecutions. But, other sanctions
could later be ameliorated by the Court. Thus, the Court's position
might be defensible when one considers the Court's differing scope of
review over state and federal statutes. When federal laws are attacked
for statutory indefiniteness, the Court might interpret them narrowly,
removing the vagueness, or, if so interpreted, the Court might hold that
the statute does not apply to the case at bar, and thereby eliminate the
problem altogether. No such course is open to the Court when it deals
with state statutes.
The second position, regarding state statutes, is exampled by Garner
and Wieman. When it is dealing with state statutes, no possibility of a
pari materia construction is open to the Court. Therefore, the Court
requires that, to overcome an argument of statutory indefiniteness,
scienter must be part and parcel of the disclaimer oath itself. But,
whether dealing with state or federal statutes, the Court seemed satis-
fied only to require scienter. But is scienter, alone, enough?
It is clear that more is required to convict a man where scienter must
be proved than when it is not required. It is also clear that the presence
or absence of scienter is an inadequate guideline with which to resolve
all questions of unconstitutional vagueness. This is particularly true
when one considers the loosely drafted and expansive definitions of
"subversive." They cast their definitional nets broadly indeed. The
reason why scienter alone is not enough to eliminate statutory indefi-
niteness is that "where the overt act which constitutes the [subversive-
ness] is insufficiently defined, a stipulation that the act must be done
intentionally before it is unlawful is of no aid in determining what acts
are in fact within the definition.""' For, if we assume that scienter is
required, precisely what is it that a person must know? The statutory
language defining the proscribed, overt act must be clear and definite
before a person can possibly have scienter. Otherwise, what is it that
he would be held to know about?
Furthermore, when affiants are confronted with the possibility of
engaging in speech, activity, or in an association that is borderline, an
honest resolution of the doubt in favor of participation is often indistin-
guishable from a willful breach of one's oath. The vagueness of a
statute in defining the specific acts which are prohibited, and about
which one must have scienter, compels men to lean over backward in
order to avoid the imputations of the loosely drawn statute. They must
110 Note, 26 MINN. L. REv. 661, 662 (1942).
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"steer far wider of the unlawful zone" ' than if the "boundaries of the
forbidden areas were clearly marked.""' 2 Clearly, in such a situation,
"the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser.""' 3 Thus, it can be
seen that scienter alone is not enough to remove statutory indefiniteness
in the situation where the prohibited, overt act is not clearly defined.
Furthermore, scienter alone is not enough to eliminate the deterrence
of freedom of expression by loosely worded "anti-subversive" statutes
that mistily define the prohibited act.
In Cramp v. Florida,"' the Supreme Court inched its way toward the
recognition that scienter alone is not enough to eliminate statutory in-
definiteness. A Florida oath statute, containing scienter, required each
state employee, as a condition of employment, to swear that he had
never "knowingly lent [his] aid, support, advice, counsel, or influence
to the Communist Party.""' A unanimous Court held that the Florida
oath was tainted with the vice of unconstitutional vagueness."' The
Florida oath said nothing about "advocacy of violent overthrow of
state or federal government," nor about "membership or affiliation with
the Communist Party." Thus, even though scienter was present, the
Court held that "the provision is completely lacking in these or any
other terms susceptible of objective measurement."" 7
The opinion of the Court in Cramp is not particularly enlightening
on precisely what terminology is "susceptible of objective measure-
ment." Certainly, Cramp's retrospective oath reaching backward into
"the unending past" was deficient. Thus, the case provides one ex-
ample of statutory language that fails to meet that standard. But
more importantly, Cramp demonstrates that the Court cautiously had
shifted its focus from scienter as the sole test of statutory indefiniteness
to scienter plus a scrutiny of the language defining the proscribed, overt
act. For it was the statutory language defining the prohibited act that
Cramp required to be "susceptible of objective measurement."
The two oaths in Baggett v. Bullitt were similar to the one in Cramp
in the sense that each oath carried the requisite element of scienter in
"' Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
112 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964).
113 Id. at 374.
114368 U.S. 278 (1961).
5 Id. at 285.
11 Id. at 287: "In the light of our decisions, it appears upon a mere inspection that
these general words and phrases are so vague and indefinite that any penalty pre
scribed for their violation constitutes a denial of due process of law. It is not tht
penalty itself that is invalid but the exaction of obedience to a rule or standard that
is so vague and indefinite as to be really no rule or standard at all."
117 Id. at 286.
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each of its clauses."' But the two Washington oaths were unlike the
one in Cramp in two important respects. First, the Washington oaths
were current and prospective only, while Cramp's was retrospective." 9
Second, the Washington oaths included language relating to "advocacy
of violent overthrow of... government" and to "membership or affilia-
tion with the Communist Party." Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
explicitly relied on Cramp in its holding that the two Washington oaths
were unconstitutionally vague. 2 ' The defect common to both Washing-
ton oaths was, unquestionably, their failure to define the prohibited,
overt act with sufficient clarity.' 2 ' Therefore, the vague statutory lan-
"
8 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 384 (1964) : "The Washington Supreme Court
has said that knowledge is to be read into every provision and we accept this con-
struction. Nostrand v. Balmer, 53 Wn2d 460, 483-84; Nostrand v. Little, 58 Wn.2d
111, 123-24."
119 Compare the oath in Cramp, text accompanying note 115 supra, with the text
following notes 16 and 66 supra.
120 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 366, 372 (1964).
121 Id. at 371-72; 369-70: When passing on the "1931 oath" the Supreme Court
observed that:
The range of activities which are or might be deemed inconsistent with the
required promise is very wide indeed. The teacher who refused to salute the
flag or advocated refusal because of religious beliefs might well be accused of
breaching his promise. Even criticism of the design or color scheme of the state
flag or unfavorable comparison of it with that of a sister state or foreign country
could be deemed disrespectful and therefore violative of the oath. And what are
"institutions" for the purposes of this oath? Is it every "practice, law, custom,
which is a material and persistent element in the life or culture of an organized
social group" or every "established society or corporation," every "establishment,
especially one of a public character."? The oath may prevent a professor from
criticizing his state judicial system or the Supreme Court or the institution ofjudicial review. Or it might be deemed to proscribe advocating the abolition, for
example, of the Civil Rights Commission, the House Committee on Un-American
Activities, or foreign aid....
Indulging every presumption of a narrow construction of the provisions of the
1931 oath, consistent, however, with a proper respect for the English language,
we cannot say that this oath provides an ascertainable standard of conduct or
that it does not require more than a State may command under the guarantees
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
In its decision on the "1955 oath," the Supreme Court queried:
But what is it that the Washington professor must "know"? Must he know
that his aid or teaching will be used by another and that the person aided had
the requisite guilty intent or is it sufficient that he know that his aid or teaching
would or may be useful to others in the commission of acts intended to over-
throw the government? Is it subversive activity, for example, to attend and
participate in international conventions of mathematicians and exchange views
with scholars from Communist countries? What about the editor of a scholarlyjournal who analyzes and criticizes the manuscripts of Communist scholars sub-
mitted for publication? Is selecting outstanding scholars from Communist coun-
tries as visiting professors and advising teaching or consulting with them at the
University of Washington a subversive activity if such scholars are known to be
Communists, or regardless of their affiliations, regularly teach students who are
members of the Communist Party, which by statutory definition is subversive
and dedicated to the overthrow of the Government?
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guage required "foreswearing of an undefined variety of 'guiltless know-
ing behavior' [which] is what the Court condemned in Cramp.'.22
The concept of "guiltless knowing behavior" is the key to the
Baggett opinion. It applies to a situation where a legislature might
constitutionally possess power to regulate in one area, "A," but is con-
stitutionally forbidden to regulate in another area, "B," e.g., freedom
of expression. Suppose an oath statute is passed, seeking to regulate
area "A." But, suppose further, that the language of the oath statute
is so broad that the oath has indiscriminately encroached upon area
"B." In this situation the oath includes "guiltless knowing behavior."
The net result necessarily places a person in a situation of speculation,
to guess at his peril whether he can constitutionally be punished for
breach of the oath statute. As the Court put it: "Those with a con-
scientious regard for what they solemnly swear or affirm, sensitive to
the perils posed by the oath's indefinite language, avoid the risk of loss
of employment, and perhaps profession, only by restricting their con-
duct to that which is unquestionably safe. Free Speech may not be so
inhibited. 123
The Court's opinion in Baggett sheds some light on what is the test
of whether an oath statute has been cast in sufficiently definite lan-
guage. To be adequate, the description of the proscribed, overt act
must be circumscribed in such a way as not to include within its defini-
tion any "guiltless knowing behavior." Thus, it is crucial to determine
what knowing behavior is guiltless. When addressing itself to this
problem in Baggett, the Court offered the following test:' 24
Does the statute reach endorsement or support for Communist candidates
for office? Does it reach a lawyer who represents the Communist Party
or its members or a journalist who defends constitutional rights of the
Communist Party or its members or anyone who supports any cause
which is likewise supported by Communists or the Communist Party?
It would appear that if any of the above questions can be answered in
the affirmative, then, the statute includes "guiltless knowing behavior."
Thus, it can be seen that Baggett v. Bullitt has added an important
dimension to the void for vagueness doctrine. It concentrates on the
definition of the proscribed act. Scienter alone is not enough. In addi-
tion, Baggett is a good example of the way the Court uses the void for
122 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 368 (1964).
'
2 d. at 372.
'
2 41d. at 368.
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vagueness doctrine as an insulating buffer zone, protecting the peri-
pheries of the several freedoms found in the Bill of Rights. 5 The
result is that the Court need not base its decision on the first amend-
ment, thereby avoiding passing on questions of ultimate power. It now
appears that the Court may not be required to reach this ultimate issue
regarding oaths, i.e., whether they are a prior restraint on freedom of
expression under the first amendment. A different line of develop-
ment is beginning to appear.
Baggett does not stand for the proposition that a state is absolutely
without constitutional power to require a loyalty oath of state em-
ployees as a condition of academic employment. Rather, the case only
controls those oaths that are "too vague," i.e., lacking scienter or in-
cluding "guiltless knowing behavior" within their definitions. Never-
theless, all oaths appear to be substantially impaired.
The reasons for this view about test oaths are two. First, there is the
sweeping breadth of the Court's criteria in Baggett for determining
when an oath's definition of the prohibited act unconstitutionally en-
compasses "guiltless knowing behavior." Second, another recent case,
Malloy v. Hogan,'26 holds "that the Fifth Amendment's exception from
compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the fourteenth
amendment against abridgement by the States."'27 When Malloy is
combined with Baggett, it appears that loyalty oaths face a rocky con-
stitutional road indeed. This is because these two cases, if extended to
the limits of their logic, would seem to allow little other than an oath
similar to that provided by article six of the Constitution. It may
come to be the only oath escaping a decision of unconstitutionality.
Thus, if Baggett and Malloy are as broad as they appear to be, the
Court may never need to resolve the question of loyalty oaths under
the First Amendment.
125 "[T]his Court has intimated that stricter standards of permissive statutory
vagueness may be applied to a statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech;
a man may the less be required to act at his peril here, because the free dissemination
of ideas may be the loser." Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1959).126 378 U.S. 1 (1964), and see Synposium, The Prizilege Against Self-Incrimina-
tion, 51 J. CpIm. L., C. & P.S. 128-189 (1960).
'2- Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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